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Do We Have 18th Century Courts
for the 21st Century?
Michael L. Buenger'
"Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society.
It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained,
or until liberty be lost in the pursuit."
James Madison'
INTRODUCTION
A symposium on the crisis in state court funding is an important event;
a clear acknowledgment that the backbone of our justice system is at
risk in ways that reach beyond philosophical divides and partisan politics to
squeeze at the very heart of access to justice in America. No aspect of this
country's adjudicatory system has greater reach or more influence on the
daily lives of citizens than the state courts. 3 Support for the symposium by
the University of Kentucky College of Law, the American Bar Association
and the National Center for State Courts is an indication of the potentially
devastating consequences that this funding crisis poses to our nation's
social, economic and political fabric. We may be inclined to see this latest
crisis as a new development, something wholly unanticipated and therefore
without precedence. 4 However, any observer of the last thirty years can
attest that the present crisis has been long in coming; that it is another
funding crisis in a stream of crises to hit many state courts.5 This one is
I Senior Counsel, National Center for State Courts. Formally senior rule of law advisor
in Kosovo and state court administrator for the states of Missouri and South Dakota. Special
thanks to Thomas Gottschalk, Esq. Mary C. McQueen, Esq. Professor Michael A. Wolff, Bar-
rister Chris Halburd, and Dr. Ingo Keilitz, for their comments and support.
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
3 In 2009, some io6 million cases were filed in state courts. R. LAFOUNTAIN ETAL., NAT'L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2009 STATE
COURT CASELOADS 3 (2OI i), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/FlashMicrosites/CSP/
images/CSP2009.pdf. By contrast, 1.535 million cases were filed with federal courts, including
1.z million bankruptcy cases. See Judicial Caseload Indicators, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.
gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/209/ftontlndi-
catorsMaro9.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
4 The impact of the current crisis is widespread. See generally Budget Resource Center,
NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/information- and- resources/budget- re-
source- center.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
5 Seegenerally Michael L. Buenger, Of Money andJudicial Independence: Can Inherent Powers
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undoubtedly the deepest, longest, and most threatening in generations.6
But it is not unique; it is not happenstance;7 it is unprecedented in scale,
not familiarity. We may be inclined to blame legislatures and executives
for their inattentiveness to the crisis, seeing them as out of touch with the
importance of the state judiciary's role in our constitutional system. In
response, we marshal our collective assets - the bench, the bar and other
interests - in an effort to persuade policymakers and the public yet again of
the importance of our state justice systems.'
Still we must candidly acknowledge that the problems facing many state
courts are not simply money- driven. They emanate from combinations
of stresses such as declining tax revenues,' increasing mandatory health
care costs,1  political polarization," contentious judicial elections,"
Protect State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92 Ky. L.J. 979 (2004) (discussing previous state fund-
ing crises); Joseph P. Nadeau, Ensuring Adequate Long- Term Funding for Courts: Recommenda-
tionsfrom the ABA Commission on State Court Funding, JUDGES' J., Summer 2004, at 15 (introduc-
ing the Commission on State Court Funding's recommendations); William C. Vickrey et al.,
Access to Justice: A Broader Perspective, 42 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1147 (2009) (discussing long- term
access to justice as opposed to focusing on the short- term budget crises).
6 See, e.g., Cyndy Brucato. Incoming GOP Chair of State Senate Judiciary Committee: 'We
Are Near a Constitutional Crisis', MINNPosT (Dec. 15, 2oio), http://www.minnpost.com/cyndy-
brucato/2o0o/1 z/t5/2422o/incoming-gopchair of state.senate-judiciary-committee we_
arenear_a_constitutional-crisis; Ari Burack, San Francisco' Superior Court Cuts 67 Workers,
Services, S.F. EXAMINER (Oct. 3, 2o i), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2oI i/io/san- francis-
cos- superior- court- cuts- 67- workers- services; Joseph Goldstein, After Cuts, Defendants'
Wait to See a Judge Often Exceeds 24 Hours, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2O 1, at A22; Megan Matteucci,
Ga. Supreme Court Justices Volunteer to Take 3 Unpaid Days, ATLANTA J.- CONST. (Sept. 2, 2009),
http://www.ajc.com/news/ga- supreme- court- justices- I 29475.html.
7 The budget crisis is not limited to state funded system; it is impacting locally funded
courts. See, e.g., A. G. Sulzberger, Facing Cuts, a City Repeals Its Domestic Violence Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 201 I, atAI I.
8 See, e.g., Press Release, Judicial Council of Cal., Chief Justice Urges Bench/Bar Leaders
to Work Together to Restore Judicial Branch Budget (Sept. 2o, 2011) (on file with the author),
available at http://courts.ca.gov/documents/nrso- I I.pdf; Peter Hardin, State Court Funding
'Crisis'a Focus forABA, GAVEL GRAB (Feb. 9, 201 1), http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=1781o.
9 See NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES 44- 54
(201), available at http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/2oi I%2oFall%2oFiscal%2oSur-
vey%aoof%2oStates.pdf.
I o See Michael Cooper, Bigger Share of State Cash for Medicaid, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011,
at A23.
ii William A. Galston, Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary, 77 UMKC L. REV. 307,
320- 24 (zoo8). See generally Paul Frymer, Debating the Causes of Party Polarization in America,
99 CALIF. L. REV. 335 (20 i) (commenting on Pildes' article and discussing additional causes
of political polarization); Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyper-
polarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011) (discussing the causes of political
polarization in the United States).
12 See ADAm SKAGGS ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2009- 10 (201 1),
available at http://brennan.3edn.net/z3b6ot 18bc49d599bd_35m6yyon3.pdf. Among the find-
ings are:
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the information technology revolution,'3 globalization,14 historical and
structural configurations that drive costs, i" political resistance (internal and
external) to changes that could enable courts to become more adaptable
and efficient, 16 and even a judicial culture that values personal autonomy
over institutional coherence. 7 This crisis is, therefore, not simply one of
demands relative to resources; it is rather a crisis of demands and resources,
access and responsiveness, adaptability and relevancy. We are at a chicken-
or- egg moment. For while solving the funding crisis is beyond the reach
of the courts acting alone, this fact does not relieve us of the considerable
responsibility to consider whether systems we have become accustomed to
More than ever, a small number of super spenders played a dominant role in
influencing who sits on state supreme courts. Much of this influence was exercised
secretly.
More judges were threatened with impeachment than at any time in memory.
Merit selection, an appointment system that has historically kept special- interest
money out of high court selection in two dozen states, faced unprecedented
assault.
Id. at 1;seealso Bronson D. Bills, A PennyfortheCourt's Thoughts? The High Price ofJudicialElections,
3 Nw. J. L. & Soc. PO'Y 29, 29- 34 (zoo8); Daniel J. Meador, Reining in the Superlegislature: A
Response to Professors Carrington and Cramton, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 657,667 (2009) (noting state
judicial elections are "inviting partisan political scrutiny of the worst sort, making contests
over judicial seats indistinguishable from elections of legislators"); David E. Pozen, What
Happened in Iowa?, 11 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 9o , 90 (201 i), http://columbialawreview.org/
assets/sidebar/volume/li 1 l/9oPozen.pdf (noting state judicial elections have evolved "from
sleepy, sterile affairs into meaningful political contests"); Michael E. Solimine & Rafael Gely,
Federal and State Judicial Selection in an Interest Group Perspective, 74 Mo. L. REV. 531 (2009).
13 See, e.g., How Luther Went Viral, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 201 1, at 93, 96 (noting that social
networks have always been transformational but new technologies "enable[] lots of people to
signal their preferences en masse to their peers very quickly" thus creating momentum for
action).
14 Not only are we witnessing economic globalization but also globalized competition for
justice services. See, e.g., Lionel Leo, Case Management: Drawingfrom the Singapore Experience, 30
Civ. JUST. Q. 143, 144 (2o 1) ("Singapore's courts are widely regarded as being among the most
efficient in the world. In its Global Competitiveness Report 20o8- 2009, the World Economic Fo-
rum puts Singapore first (out of 134 countries) for the efficiency of its legal framework."); Matt
Skinner & Justin Simpkins, Enforcement of Foreign Awards in Australia, 77 ARBITRATION 54, 54
(2011) (discussing how Australia is marketing itself "as a 'pro- arbitration' state").
15 See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A STUDY OF COURT CONSOLIDATION IN MAtON-
ING COUNTY, OHIO: FINAL REPORT (2011) (recommending consolidation of Mahoning County's
eleven limited jurisdiction courts).
16 See, e.g., James D. Gingerich, Out of the Morass: The Move to State Funding of the Arkansas
Court System, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 249, 266- 67 (1995) (discussing political challenges
in funding the Arkansas courts).
17 See CHRISTINE M. DURHAM & DANIEL J. BECKER, A CASE FOR COURT GOVERNANCE PRIN-
CIPLES 2 (2011), available at http://www.ncsc.org/Services- and- Experts/Court- leadership/-/
media/Files/PDF/Services%2oand%2oExperts/Areas%200f%2oexpertise/Becker- Durham-
A- Case- for- Court- Governance- Principles.ashx (noting state courts have a culture driven
by "autonomy and self- interest[,]" and that "[a]s a consequence, judges' 'mandates' do not
all derive from the judicial institution itself, resulting in a decreased sense of organizational
identity for many new judges"); see also discussion infra note 22.
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over the course of two centuries are in need of change if access to justice is
to remain a core American virtue.
In light of the challenges we now face, I submit that we should
undertake a serious rethinking of our state courts along three thematic
lines: (1) systemic reorganization to reduce fragmentation, simplify access,
and provide greater flexibility and specialization in the use of resources;
(2) diversification of dispute resolution processes so that cases move
in different directions with a range of resolution options pegged to the
issues presented; and (3) rationalization of our governance, leadership, and
accountability systems to enhance effective organizational management
of complex institutions. These themes are not necessarily new; indeed
thinking along these lines has been floating for years largely without
taking systemic hold. And my observations are, of necessity, cursory.
Notwithstanding these challenges, it is, I submit, the responsibility of the
bench and bar to constantly push for systemic improvement, not solely in
the interest of satisfying some legislature's demand for greater efficiency
(merely a euphemism today for budget cutting), but more importantly
in the interests of enabling state courts to remain accessible, responsive,
accountable, adaptable, and relevant for the twenty- first century.
I. THE NEED FOR LEADERS
Before discussing the three themes outlined above, I want to offer the
following observation, which I believe says a great deal about the condition
of our state court systems. I propose that a stealth factor in the funding crises
that have racked state courts over the last thirty years is the declining care,
respect and prestige we assign to these diverse and complex adjudicatory
systems. Walk in many courthouses in this country and the empirical proof
is stark: overcrowded courtrooms, files sitting everywhere for lack of space,
collapsing ceilings, courthouses crumbling from disrepair, and antiquated
technology infrastructures. These are just the outward signs. Yet for many
citizens courts are courts and judges are judges that largely operate in the
shadows until something controversial arises."8 The idea that we have a
multifaceted and multi- dimensional judicial system in the United States
is a technocratic concept for lawyers and judges otherwise lost on the
general public. 19
18 Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 625, 637 (1999) ("[Tlhe public makes little distinction between state and federal
judges.").
19 Roy A. Schotland, Selection of State Appellate Judges: Political Party Affiliation in Parti-
san and Nonpartisan Judicial Elections: To the Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan Judicial
Elections, 39 WlLLAME'nrE L. REV. 1397, 1423 (2003) (noting that the public does not "make
lawyerlike distinctions between state and federal judges").
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The lack of knowledge about our state judicial systems is exasperating
even in the halls of statehouses. Terms such as "judicial activism" are
exploited for political purposes largely without concern for the rationale
of controversial decisions.2 0 Judicial elections increasingly look like raw
political combat rather than substantive, deliberative and civil debates."'
And given widespread ignorance over concepts such as separation of
powers, judicial independence, and the differing constitutional structures
of courts,"2 the budget is reemerging as a tool for political posturing.2 3 The
long- term consequences of these developments are lost on many, who
tend to suffer a profound case of illiteracy as it concerns the diversity in
structures, purposes and foundations of our justice systems. 24
This illiteracy is not, however, confined to *the general public or to a few
politicians. There is scant attention given in professional education to the
2o Bruce Fein, PutAway Sword of Damocles, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1998, at 112, 1I2 (criticizing
Congressman Tom DeLay's recommendation to impeach judges for activist rulings but noting
that "[hie conspicuously omit[ted] equally 'activist' decisions" consistent with his political
beliefs); Richard J. Neuhaus, Rebuilding the Civil Public Square, 44 Loy. L. REV. 119, 122 (1998)
("Both the Right and Left wings cynically observe that the phrase judicial activism means
court decisions one does not like."); Eric J. Segall, Reconceptualizing JudicialActivism as Judicial
Responsibility: A Tale of Two Justice Kennedys, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 709, 716 (2009) ("[B]oth liberal
and conservative politicians throw out accusations of judicial activism whenever the Court
decides cases with which they disagree.").
21 See SKAGGS ETAL.,supra note 12.
22 See, e.g., FLA. CONsT. art. V, § I ("The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court,
district courts of appeal, circuit courts and county courts. No other courts may be established
by the state, any political subdivision or any municipality."); IDAHO CONsT. art. V, § 13 ("The
legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction
which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government .. "); N.C. CONS'r.
art. IV, § I ("The General Assembly shall have no power to deprive the judicial department
of any power or jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as a co- ordinate department of the
government, nor shall it establish or authorize any courts other than as permitted by this
Article."); see also State ex rel. Neely v. Brown, 864 P.2d 1038, 1041 (Ariz. 1993) (Martone, J.,
concurring) (opining that when the constitution grants jurisdiction to a court the legislature
cannot take it away); Garcia v. Dist. Court of Denver, 403 Pad 215, 219 (Colo. 1965) (voiding
the legislature's attempt to reduce constitutional jurisdiction of district courts); Amendments
to the Fla. Rules of Workers' Comp. Procedure, 891 So. 2d 474, 477- 78 (Fla. 2004) (noting
that Florida courts derive jurisdiction entirely from the constitution); Pope v. State, 792 So.
2d 713, 720 (La. zoo) (noting that the legislature cannot divest courts of jurisdiction fixed by
the constitution).
23 See, e.g., Mark Sherman, GOP Candidates Would Cut Federal Judges' Power, Hous.
CHRON. (Oct. 24, 201 i), http://www.chron.com/news/article/GOP- candidates- would- cut-
federal- judges- power- 223221 7.php (describing how GOP presidential candidates intend to
reign in federal courts through a variety of tools including cutting budgets).
24 See, e.g., David Lowery et al., Policy Attention in State and Nation: Is Anyone Listening to
the Laboratories of Democray?, 41 PUBLIUS 286, 288 (2o 1) (noting that state and national politi-
cians share the same constituency and therefore policy attention "is hardly segmented in a
classic layer cake fashion").
20II-2012]
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diversity that underlies American legal culture and its judicial systems, 5
a fact reflected in our law schools and to a lesser extent our professional
associations.16 The legal education system is largely premised on a common
denominator for understanding judicial power: law school textbooks and
courses explain American legal culture monolithically, framed principally by
the study of federal constitutional law and federal courts.2 7 In comparison
to the federal judiciary, 28 the study of state courts garners little attention.
It is akin to the crazy uncle that shows up unannounced for a holiday
feast: you have to feed him but are not very inclined to carry on much of
a conversation. A cursory examination of American law schools' curricula
reveals that one is more likely to find a course on contemporary legal issues
in Africa, 9 Chinese law and legal institutions,3" or European Union law,31
as to find a course on state constitutional law or state court jurisprudence. 2
The demand that law schools develop students who can practice nationally
and internationally ignores the fact that most will practice locally before
state courts. As a result, we turn out law students grounded in a limited
perspective on American legal culture and courts, with an incomplete
understanding of or appreciation for what happens every day just down
z5 With regard to early state constitutions, Lawrence Friedman has observed, "[a]n ob-
server with nothing in front of him but the texts of these state constitutions could learn a great
deal about state politics, state laws, and about social life in America." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 120 (2d ed. 1985).
26 The ABA has a Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements and a Stand-
ing Committee on the Federal Judiciary. There is no standing committee on state courts,
relevant matters generally being handled through the judicial division or the Standing Com-
mittee on Judicial Independence.
27 For examples of the federally focused curricula in many law schools, see generally
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (3d ed. 2oo6); KATH-
LEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (17th ed. 2010); I LAWRENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000).
z8 See infra note 35.
29 See, e.g., Course Number 20/20- 01, YALE L. SCH., http://ylsinfo.law.yale.edu/wsw/pre-
reg/CourseDetails.asp?cClschedid=I io817 (last visited July 28, 2012).
30 See, e.g., Course Descriptions, U. MICH. L. SCH. (Apr. 2, 2012, 3:25 AM), http://web.law.
umich.edu/_ClassSchedule/courselist.asp.
31 See, e.g., Course Descriptions: European Union Law: Constitutional Law, TLANE
U. L. SCH., http://www.law.tulane.edu/tlsAcademicPrograms/courseDetail.aspx?id=231 6&__
taxonomyid=2 (last visited Apr. 2, 2012); Course Catalog: European Union Law, UNIV. MD. Scl.
L., http://www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/program/curriculum/catalog/coursedetails.
html?coursenum=526G (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
32 Often the study of state constitutions is relegated to a course on state and local gov-
ernment implying that state constitutions are not within the realm of constitutional signifi-
cance. A few law schools offer a course on state constitutional law. See, e.g., JD Program Course
Descriptions: State Constitutional Law, UNIV. Mo. SCH. L. (Mar. 22, 2012), http://law.missouri.
edu/academics/curriculum.html; Master Course List: State Constitutional Law, RUTGERS Scll. L.
- CAMDEN, http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/students/schedules/classes.shtml (last visited Apr. 2,
2012).
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the street at the local courthouse. Meanwhile, the backbone of the justice
system is calcifying.
Why is this relevant to a discussion on a state court funding crisis? For
this reason: it is from law students that we draw our future judges, bar
members and leaders, corporate counsel, and many of our administrators,
legislators, government officials, and system advocates. Law schools seed
the state justice systems with the very people responsible for institutional
leadership and vision. But we do little to prepare them to understand
the diversity of these systems, their underlying structures,33 or even the
sources of their normative powers.' State judiciaries are organic to our
understanding of government - throughout our history they have been
elemental in forming the very basis of our dispute resolution system,
both in terms of its jurisdictional nature
35 and our very notions of justice .36
Long before there was a federal judiciary, there were colonial and state
courts setting the very foundations of our ideas of justice across a scantly
populated, highly diverse, politically disaggregated nation. Most students,
however, emerge from law school with a myopic view of courts, scarcely
33 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § I ("The judicial power of the State is vested in a su-
preme court, a superior court, and the courts established by the legislature."); CAL. CONsT. art.
VI, § I ("The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, and
superior courts, all of which are courts of record."); Ky. CONST. § i09 ("The judicial power of
the Commonwealth shall be vested exclusively in one Court of Justice which shall be divided
into a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the
Circuit Court and a trial court of limited jurisdiction known as the District Court.").
Many state constitutional reforms of the so- called Progressive Era were intended to curb
legislative power. See Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle over Tort Reform and the Overlooked Legacy
of the Progressives, 39 AKRON L. REv. 943,956- 58 (2OO6); see also G. ALAN TAR, UNDERSTANDING
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 99- ioo (Princeton Univ. Press ed. 1998) (discussing the influence of
the Populist movement on nineteenth century state constitutions).
34 See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1906-41(2001).
35 In contrast to state judicial power, federal judicial power is limited. See, e.g., Anken-
brandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698 (1992) (citing Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845))
("'[Jludicial power of the United States ... is (except in enumerated instances, applicable
exclusively to this Court) dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes
of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating
the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) ... and of investing them with jurisdiction either
limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact de-
grees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good."'); see also Owen
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) ("It is a fundamental precept that
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.").
36 See, e.g., Mayo v. Wilson, I N.H. 53, 58 (N.H. 1817) (stating that citizens are subject
only to the law); Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686, 704 (N.Y. 1824) (stating that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law); Moore v. Bradley, 3 N.C.
313,314 (N.C. 18oi) (per curiam) ("No freeman shall be disseized of his freehold" but by due
process of law and judgment of a competent court); Executors of Cruden v. Neale, 2 N.C. 338
(N.C. 1796) (stating that no one may be deprived of rights except under the law).
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aware of the diversity and unique purposes rooted in our state judicial
systems.
Thus, I submit that the long term solution to the current funding
crisis is not simply appropriating more dollars. It is producing cadres of
leaders, officers of the courts, who value the role of state courts as unique
institutions of American government. Failing to do so, the state courts may
increasingly be seen as second- rate actors on the stage of the American
judicial system with second- rate funding to go along, merely lurching from
crisis to crisis. It will be impossible to innovate or modernize anything for
the twenty- first century if the courts are burdened by pervasive public
ignorance and professional inattention. Innovation is the key, particularly
in light of global developments in the justice sector.37 There are state court
systems in this country that are delaying cases,38 shuttering courtrooms,3"
increasing fees, 4 reducing hours, 41 furloughing staff,4 and shrinking access
to court programs. 43 Surely this should be of immediate and long- term
37 See Jack P. Sahl, Foreword. The New Era - - Quo Vadis?, 43 AKRON L. REv. 641, 644
(zoIO) ("Ease of mobility, new technology, national and transnational markets, and develop-
ments in the lawyer- regulatory regimes of states and nations have all contributed to the
ever- increasing nationalization and internationalization of the legal services market."); Prab-
hakar Singh & Shilpi Bhattacharya, The Changing Role of Law in Asia: Revolution or-Devolution?,
2 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. vii, vii (2011) ("The new Asian approach to law means ... groping
towards Westernization as well as running away from it."); supra notes 13- 14 and accompany-
ing text.
38 See, e.g., Diana Filkins, New York's Court Crisis, ALB. GOV'T L. REV. (Sept. 18, 2011),
http://aglr.wordpress.com/zo1I/9/i8/new- york%E2%8o%99s- court- crisis/ (describing im-
pact of state court budget cuts to court services); Lynda Waddington, Judicial Budget Cuts Con-
tinue to Negatively Impact Ordinary Iowans, IOWA INDEP. (Jan. 12, zoi), http://iowaindependent.
com/5057i/judicial- budget- cuts- continue- to- negatively- impact- ordinary- iowans.
39 See, e.g., Paul Elias, San Francisco Court Closure: 2oo Employees and25 Courtrooms Gone,
HUFFINGTON POST S.F. (July 19, 201 i), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zo 1/07/18/san- fran-
cisco- courtroom- closure_n.902097.html (noting San Francisco superior court is shuttering
twenty- five courtrooms).
40 See, e.g., Budget Resource Center: Idaho, NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.
org/Information- and- Resources/Budget- Resource- Center/States- activities- map/Idaho.
aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (noting Idaho has passed a bill of emergency surcharges to help
fund the courts).
41 See, e.g., Budget Resource Center: Colorado, NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.
org/Information- and- Resources/Budget- Resource- Center/States- activities- map/Colo-
rado.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (observing that, in response to budget cuts, courts have
reduced operating hours).
42 See, e.g., Budget Resource Center: Oregon, NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.
org/Information- and- Resources/Budget- Resource- Center/States- activities- map/Or-
egon.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 20 i 2) ("[Clourts have reduced hours of operation, imposed staff
layoffs, delayed filling judicial vacancies in the clerks' offices and in judicial support positions,
frozen staff salaries, and reduced the use of retired judges.").
43 See, e.g., Budget Resource Center: New Mexico, NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTs., http://www.
ncsc.org/Information- and- Resources/Budget- Resource- Center/States- activities- map/
New- Mexico.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) ("New Mexico has had to eliminate some prob-
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concern for all of us, for these developments have been long in coming and
are largely the result of inattention to an impending crisis of funding and
relevancy.
II. SIMPLIFICATION AND SYSTEMIC COHERENCY
Court reform today is a weighty global issue.' Throughout the world
effective and independent judiciaries are seen as a core indicator of
good governance, social stability, and economic well- being.45 Although
empirically debated,' nations with truly effective and independent judicial
systems seem to enjoy more robust economic growth, better civil order,
and less corruption than those that lack such systems. 47 Consequently,
policymakers have expended large sums of money to promote reform in
countries where weak judicial systems are seen as major impediments
to stability, progress, and the rule of law.48 Much emphasis in rule of law
programming has been on protecting private property and contract rights
as lynchpins for stabilizing economies, attracting foreign investment, and
promoting democratic reforms. 4' Effective judiciaries are seen as key to
lem- solving courts (drug courts, mental health courts) and has had to reduce enrollments in
almost all such programs.").
44 See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981)
(discussing an overview of court systems and providing a comparison of common law, civil law,
Chinese, and Islamic legal traditions); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY,
POLITICS, THEORY (2004) (discussing the rule of law from Ancient Greece and Rome, through
the Medieval period, through the rise of liberalism, to the modern day rule of law on both the
national and international levels); THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate
& Torbj6rn Vallinder eds. 1995) (discussing "judicialization" in the world's political systems).
45 See Adesegun A. Akin- Olugbade, The Importance of Law in the Economic Development
Process of African Countries, and the ADB Group ' Support for the Legal Harmonisation Effort in
Africa, 2oo8 INT'L Bus. L.J. 751, 752 (2oo8) (discussing "the causal relation between the pros-
perity of a nation and the quality of its institutions").
46 See Hilton L. Root & Karen May, Judicial Systems and Economic Development, in RULE
By LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 304 (Tom Ginsburg &Tamir
Moustafa eds., 2008) (noting causal link between a quality legal system, economic growth and
democratic reforms is difficult to empirically establish).
47 See generally MATTHEW M. TAYLOR, JUDGING POLICY: COURTS AND POLICY REFORM IN
DEMOCRATIC BRAZIL (2008).
48 See Ronald J. Daniels & Michael Trebilcock, The Political Economy of Rule of Law
Reform in Developing Countries, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 99, 109 (2004) (noting "lack of effective
political demand for reforms" and "vested supply- side interests" render reform "politically
difficult to realize" and are major impediments to development).
49 See, e.g., Erik G. Jensen, The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy of
Diverse Institutional Patterns and Reformers' Responses, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EM-
PIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 336, 347 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds.,
2003) (noting the role of the Washington Consensus in supporting rule of law development
programming to advance private sector expansion).
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this effort. The World Bank, 10 the International Monetary Fund,5 the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 2 the American Bar
Association (ABA), 53 the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), 4 and
others are actively engaged in reform efforts across the globe.55 While not
all efforts at judicial reform have been seen as rousing successes, 56 the
importance of an effective and functioning judicial system to the economic,
social and political well- being of a nation appears self- evident.
But if we turned the lens of reform on the United States, we might find
that we fall short of what we preach. While we advocate for improved access,
transparency, effectiveness and simplicity overseas, many of our courts
continue to labor under paradigms devised in the 18th and 19th century,
made more complicated in the 20th century, only to produce unintelligible
structures for the 21st century. American courts were constructed to
serve local needs, 7 not necessarily to promote organizational solidity
or jurisdictional coherency. They were designed when the dominant
considerations were attention to local politics58 and how far someone could
50 See VIVEK MARu, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND LEGAL EMPOWERMENT: A REVIEW OF WORLD
BANK PRACTICE, JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING PAPER SERIES (2OO9), available at http://
www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/1 1/25/00033
3038_200911 25020239/Rendered/PDF/5 I 843oNWPoAcce IoBox342o5oBo IPUBLIC i.pdf.
51 See Martin S. Kenney, The Role of National Government in the Restraint of Global Economic
Crime, 7 J. FIN. CRIME 129, 132 (1999) (discussing IMF conditioning funds "upon evidence
of good governance," including "reform of the judicial process"); see also David P. Fidler, A
Kinder, Gentler System of Capitulations? International Law, Structural Adjustment Policies, and the
Standard of Liberal, Globalized Civilization, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 387, 398- 408 (2ooo) (giving an
overview of the World Bank and IMF programs).
52 See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., GUIDANCE FOR PROMOTING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AND IMPARTIALITY 5- 7 (2OO2), available at http://www.usaid.gov/ourwork/democracy-and-
governance/publications/pdfs/pnacmoo7.pdf.
53 See ABA Rule of Law Initiative -Promoting the Rule of Law, AM. BAR ASS'N, http:/lapps.
americanbar.org/rol/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
54 See NCSC International, NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http:/www.ncscinternational.org
(last viewed Feb. 13, 2012).
55 See Governance and Conflict, DEP'T FOR INT'L DEV. (UKAID), http://www.dfid.gov.uk/
What- we- do/Key- Issues/Governance- and- conflict] (last viewed Feb. 13, 2012).
56 See, e.g., Carlos Santiso, Economic Reform and Judicial Governance in Brazil: Balancing
Independence with Accountability, in DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY
FUNCTION OF COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 161, 172- 73 (Siri Gloppen et al. eds., 2004) (not-
ing serious questions have arisen over the judiciary's misuse of financial autonomy to pay high
salaries and build luxurious courthouses); Brent T. White, Rotten to the Core: Project Capture and
the Failure of Judicial Reform in Mongolia, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 2o9, 2 16- 17 (2009).
57 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 18 (noting that for much of American history, "[tihe
basic courts were governing courts; they did not merely settle disputes. And local rule was rule
by the local powers").
58 See Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State andLocal Politics by Correcting the Exces-
sive Independence of the Supreme Court, 5o ALA. L. REV. 397, 397- 98 (1999); Michael R. Dimino,
Sr., The Worst Way of Selecting Judges- Except All the Others that Have Been Tried, 3 2 N. KY. L. REV.
267, 267- 69 (2005); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 43, 43
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ride on horseback in a day. Consequently, Roscoe Pound's critique of the
American justice system remains valid today: in many states the system
is complex, costly, and slow. s9 While computer systems allow for internet
access, and problem- solving courts bring new approaches to dispute
resolution,' the fact remains that some of our citizens have better access to
justice than others not simply in terms of tracking a case on the internet but
more importantly in ease of entry into the system and the resources that are
brought to bear to solve problems.
One area that has resisted change in recent years is systematically
simplifying the structure of our state judiciaries and adapting their
administration to meet emerging trends. Yet that is where we need to
move. Take for example New York, where in 2007 then Chief Judge Judith
Kaye commissioned a study on the structure of the state court system. After
months of study, the commission concluded the following:
New York State has the most archaic and bizarrely-convoluted court
structure in the country. Antiquated provisions in our state Constitution
create a confusing amalgam of trial courts: an inefficient and wasteful
system that causes harm and heartache to all manner of litigants, and
costs businesses, municipalities and taxpayers in excess of half a billion
dollars per year.
Other states have long ago streamlined their court systems to make
them efficient, attractive to business and sensitive to the needs of
litigants. New York, on the other hand, continues to operate a blizzard
of overlapping courts: Supreme Courts, County Courts, Family Courts,
Surrogate's Courts, a Court of Claims, New York City Criminal and
Civil Courts, District Courts, City Courts, and Town and Village Justice
Courts.
New York has eleven separate trial courts; by contrast, California, a state
that has twice our population, has only one.
6'
The New York City Bar Association agreed with the findings calling for
significant reform.6 Legislation was introduced to collapse the myriads of
(2003); Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justices in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the Backroom?, 41 S.
TEx. L. REV. 1197, 1200- 10 (2000); Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of
Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 625, 639- 40 (1999).
59 See Roscoe Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40
AM. L. REV. 729, 731-34 (19o6).
6o See Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Community Courts and Community Justice -
Foreword: Problem- Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1501, 1506- 07 (2003). But see Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-
Solving Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimaty, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1459- 60 (2004).
61 SPECIAL COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF THE N.Y. STATE COURTS, A COURT SYSTEM FOR
THE FUTURE: THE PROMISE OF COURT RESTRUCTURING IN NEW YORK STATE 7 (2007), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/reports/courtsys- 4future2007.pdf; see also Joan B. Carey, Consolida-
tion ofthe State's Courts: Judge Kayes Proposal, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. CITY L. 25 (1998).
62 See Court Restructuring, N.Y.C. BAR Ass'N, http://www.abcny.org/legislative- affairs/pol-
icy- issues- aamp- advocacy/justice- system/court- restructuring (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
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trial courts into a more rational system that would eliminate the "confusing
amalgam." 63 Yet efforts to address these concerns have gone nowhere.
6 4
New York is not alone in having a "confusing amalgam" of courts. The
Texas court system has been described as "complicated, inefficient, and
poorly structured to handle modern litigation. ' 6 Since their creation in
the late 1800s, the Texas courts have "been expanded periodically on a
purely adhoc basis" resulting in a "system [that] is replete with anomalies
and peculiarities. '66 Today Texas has one supreme court and one court
of criminal appeals, fourteen courts of appeal, 436 district courts, thirteen
criminal district courts, 254 constitutional county courts, eighteen probate
courts, 227 county court at law, 1,414 municipal courts, and 821 justice
courts.67 Similarly, the Ohio judiciary is comprised of one supreme court,
twelve district courts of appeals sitting as eighty- eight county appellate
courts,68 eighty- eight courts of common pleas, 128 municipal courts,
thirty- eight county courts, 335 mayor courts, and one court of claims.69
Mahoning County, Ohio alone is served by twelve limited jurisdiction
63 S. 5827, 2007- o8 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?s
h=printbill&bn=So5827&term=2007.
64 See SPECIAL COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF THE N.Y. STATE COURTS, JUSTICE MOST Lo-
CAL: THE FUTURE OF TOWN AND VILLAGE COURTS IN NEW YORK STATE 1O (2OO8), available at
http://www.nyslocalgov.org/pdf/Justice-MostLocal.pdf (acknowledging problems with Jus-
tice Courts and that while eliminating them would be ideal, a comprehensive reform would
likely meet with the same political fate of previous reform efforts of the last I oo years); see also
Robert J. Sheran & Douglas K. Amdahl, Minnesota Judicial System: Twenty- Five Years Of Radical
Change, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 219, 227 (2003) (acknowledging the challenges of moving from a
highly fragmented system to a more unified system).
65 Executive Summary to TEXANS FOR LAWSUIT REFORM FOUND., in RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR REFORM: ThE TEXAS JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2007), available at http://www.tlrfoundation.com/
reform- texas- courts.
66 Id.; see CITIZEN'S COMMISSION ON THE TEXAs JUDICIAL SYSTEM: REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS 3 (1993), available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tjc/publications/cc_tjs.pdf
("Texas has no uniform judicial framework to guarantee the just, prompt and efficient dispo-
sition of a litigant's complaint. The framers of our current Constitution deliberately designed
a system to 'localize justice,' establishing a multiplicity of largely autonomous, conveniently
located courts across the state. With the passage of time, the organization of the courts has
become more, not less cumbersome."); Dean Frank Newton, The Trouble with Texas Courts, 51
S. Ttx. L. REV. 947, 947 (2010) ("[The Texas court system faces two distinct challenges: ac-
cepting and applying known 'best practices' and maintaining relevance in a changing world.");
Carl Reynolds, Texas Courts 2o3o-Strategic Trends & Responses, 51 S. TEx. L. REV. 951, 953
(2010) ("Texas judicial system is complicated, inefficient, and poorly structured ....").
67 See Court Statistics Project, State Court Structure Charts: Texas, NAT'L CENTER FOR ST.
CTS., http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other- Pages/State- Charts[Texas.aspx (last visited Mar.
7, 2012).
68 See OHIO CONST. art IV, § 3 ("The court shall hold sessions in each county of the dis-
trict as the necessity arises.").
69 See Court Statistics Project, State Court Structure Charts: Ohio, NAT'L CENTER FOR ST.
CTS., http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other- Pages/State- Charts/Ohio.aspx (last visited Mar.
7, 2012).
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courts and one general jurisdiction court, each its own administrative cost
center.70 In contrast, California, Minnesota and Utah have one supreme
court, one court of appeals, and one trial court." A citizen going to court in
these states is not confronted by a "confusing amalgam" of structures, they
simply go to court.
I do not mean to suggest that all state courts must look the same or that
structural adaptations are unnecessary to address parochial needs. This is
a large and diverse nation. Nor do I mean to suggest that just because a
court system looks streamlined on paper that it operates as such in practice.
Hierarchical and internal bureaucratic processes can be as problematic
to access and efficiency as structural impediments. But I do suggest the
following three points. First, many state court structures evolved in an
ad hoc fashion over time with little regard to organizational cohesion,
jurisdictional coherency, or systemic agility.7" Today many overarching
court structures reflect historical thinking producing jurisdictional and
administrative fragmentation,73 not thinking based on a systemic business
model concentrating on affordability, timeliness, simplicity, accessibility,
and organizational cohesion. The fact that some courts are state funded
and others are locally funded is really beside the point. Rather, the issue is
this: are courts organizationally and jurisdictionally structured to promote
access to justice or to preserve ad hoc historic anomalies and internal
autonomy? No one today would seriously design a modern court system
around a model that is a multi- layered, administratively duplicative,
organizationally fragmented, confusing amalgam.7 4 Such a system with
70 See A STUDY OF COURT CONSOLIDATION IN MAHONING COUNTY, OHIO: FINAL REPORT,
supra note 15.
71 See Court Statistics Project, State Court Structure Charts: California, NAT'L CENTER FOR
ST. CTS., http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other- Pages/State- Charts/California.aspx (last vis-
ited Mar. 7, 2012); Court Statistics Project, State Court Structure Charts: Minnesota, NAT'L CENTER
FOR ST. CTS., http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other- Pages/State- Charts/Minnesota.aspx (last
visited Mar. 7, 2012); Court Statistics Project, State Court Structure Charts: Utah, NAT'L CENTER
FOR ST. CTs., http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other- Pages/State- Charts/Utah.aspx (last visited
Mar. 7, 2012).
72 Compare OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. IV, with OHIO CONsT. art. IV (showing that the
original 1851 court structure is the foundation of the current system with only minor changes).
For a discussion on the evolution of the Maine judicial system, see Leigh I. Saufley, Funding
Justice. The Budget of the Maine Judicial Branch-We Did Get Therefrom Here, 62 ME. L. REv. 671
(2o10). For example, §i6 of article V of the Missouri Constitution still requires an associate
circuit judge in each county of the state, regardless of caseload.
73 Fragmentation is not simply a jurisdiction problem but also extends to the adminis-
tration of the courts. See Judith S. Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Needfor a Fresh
Look at How Courts Are Run, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 851, 854 (1997); Reynolds, supra note 66, at
954- 55-
74 See Carolyn D. Schwarz, Note, Unified Family Courts: A Saving Grace for Victims of Do-
mestic Violence Living in Nations with Fragmented Court Systems, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 304, 304 (2004)
(arguing that fragmentation is pervasive throughout the U.S. and although it wreaks havoc on
all parties, victims of domestic violence are especially affected).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
its duplicative cost centers would sap resources that might otherwise be
directed to litigant needs
Second, state courts today face a complex qualitative and quantitative
litigation environment. Intellectual property, business disputes,
environmental concerns, the emergence of specialized needs, and other
complex matters fill the dockets of state courts. Suits stemming from
the recent financial crisis demonstrate that quantitative complexity can
present its own significant challenges.75 The increase in qualitative and
quantitative complexity will require state courts to increasingly balance
three fundamental themes: (1) responding to specialization of practice;76 (2)
ensuring reasonable geographical access; and (3) confronting the need to
achieve rational economies of scale. These three themes do not necessarily
complement one another; indeed in many circumstances they may conflict
as, for example, demands for specialization result in a proliferation of so-
called "boutique" courts contrary to interests in economies of scale and a
simpler jurisdictional system.
These challenges, nevertheless, open opportunities to innovate by
addressing the themes in combinations to improve access to justice
substantively and geographically while meeting demands for more
efficiency and cost savings. While we may opine that "one size doesn't fit
all," our dispute resolution systems tend precisely to do that from beginning
to end given its emphasis on generalization. Certain complex cases might
be better served by assignment to unified specialty dockets within a few
courts, in effect creating "judicial centers of excellence" where judges
and court staffs have particularized training and expertise.77 Other cases
75 See Sharon Press, Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation in Florida-Implementation Challenges
for an Institutionalized Program, I i NEv. L.J. 306, 320 (2011 ) ("Initially, the response to the
[foreclosure] crisis was piecemeal with individual chief judges establishing programs ... rather
than a coordinated state response.").
76 See Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REv. 519, 521- 22
(2008) (discussing resistance to specialization by federal courts). State courts have been more
willing to embrace specialization, but largely in an ad hoc fashion. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 1, 3- 4 (1995) (discussing the use of specialized courts for corporate and commercial legal
issues); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two CheersforSpecialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 71(0995) ("Per-
haps theoretical negativism about specialization is not only overstated but outright wrong in
some important ways.").
77 The notion of specialization that concentrated certain case types is neither new nor
radical. See Parke- Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 E 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("The
[German] court summons technical judges to whom technical questions are submitted and
who can intelligently pass upon the issues without blindly groping among testimony upon
matters wholly out of their ken. How long we shall continue to blunder along without the aid
of unpartisan and authoritative scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one
knows; but all fair persons not conventionalized by provincial legal habits of mind ought, I
should think, unite to effect some such advance."); Edward V. Di Lello, Fighting Fire with Fire-
fighters: A Proposalfor Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 493- 507 (1993)
(proposing creation of a system of expert magistrate judges to try cases involving technical
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may demand that concerns for geographical access be the predominant
consideration in case assignment. What is called for in the end is developing
more agile systemic approaches and techniques to improve access, case
management and resolution in order to deliver just results with minimal
processing time and inconvenience to the parties, given the substantive
nature of each dispute. We must recognize the need for differentiated
systems of access (not just case management), and coherent systems of
court administrative and support processes tailored to efficiently identify
the key contested issues in a case leading to their prompt resolution
through a variety of techniques. Just as the world is becoming at once more
diverse and integrated, so too must our state justice systems if they are to
remain effective and relevant.
Finally, as courts confront this more complex adjudication environment,
it is important to resist the temptation to create more layers of independent
jurisdictional systems and their attending cost centers.78 Rather, efforts
should be focused on flattening structures to promote interdependency
between courts, both specialized and general, within a simplified
jurisdictional and administrative configuration. Citizens should not be
forced to guess where a court's jurisdiction lies. Rationalizing and aligning
confusing, contradictory and overlapping points of entry into the system
and sharing best practices across the system can simplify access, reduce
administrative redundancies, leverage resources and promote innovation
through shared knowledge. Over the last thirty years private industry
has spent considerable time and effort in pursuit of similar objectives. In
contrast, many public institutions, including many courts, remain thirty
years behind the curve and frequently resistant to it. The goal should not
be to homogenize justice; it is to simplify access to justice and the resources
dedicated to the business of justice.79
The costs of running courts are not driven by the personnel and
operations expenditures evidenced in the budgetary line items. These
issues); Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 745, 784 (1981) (sug-
gesting that in factually complex cases a specialist option would be a useful alternative to a
generalist court). In the 1970s, Judge Henry Friendly noted:
[C]ourts ... deal today with ... electronics, chemistry, biochemistry, pharmacology,
optics, harmonics and nuclear physics, which are quite beyond the ability of the
usual judge to understand without the expenditure of an inordinate amount of
educational effort by counsel and of attempted self- education by the judge, and
in many instances, even with it.
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 156-57 (1973).
78 See, e.g., Sarang Vijay Damle, Specialize the Judge, Not the Court: A Lesson from the German
Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2005).
79 Unfortunately, state legislatures tend to look at improvements solely from the stand-
point of savings not from the standpoint of redirecting resources to improve access to justice.
As such, they discourage systemic improvements because there is little incentive to restruc-
ture if the courts are left with less resources and still less access.
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expenditures merely reflect functional demands and structural choices
that have been made over time. The true cost- drivers of a court system
emanate fundamentally from jurisdictional, administrative and case
managements constructs that form its heart. In addressing the discrepancy
between funding, access and service, it is important to examine whether
our foundational structures are in need of innovation and reform. The
challenge is not simply accepting the impact of a rapidly changing world
but anticipating how changes in quality and quantity will require courts to
readapt the structural concepts that have undergirded the system for 200
years.8°
III. THE COURTHOUSE AS TRIAGE CENTER,
THE COURTROOM AS OPERATING ROOM
In 1976 Professor Frank Sander proposed the concept of the
"comprehensive justice center" that offered litigants a number of dispute
resolution processes ranging from mediation to arbitration to litigation and
beyond.81 The idea of the "multi- door courthouse" has been adopted by
judicial systems around the world. The Subordinate Courts of Singapore,"
the family courts of Australia,83 the High Court of Justice for Lagos'
all operate to one degree or the other on the "multi- door courthouse"
concept." In many courts of the United States the "multi- door" concept
8o This challenge does not only apply to state courts. See Martha J. Dragich, Once a Cen-
tury: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 11, 14- 15 (1996);
Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603,603- 04 (1989).
81 Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Resolution, in POUND CONFERENCE: NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE 147 (Apr. 7- 9, 1976), available at http://geoffsharp.atomicrobot.co.nz/wp- content/up-
loads/2o I o/3/PoundConfSander.pdf.
82 See generally SUBORDINATE COURTS OF SINGAPORE, http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/sub-
courts/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
83 See Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) sch I (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.
au/au/legis/cth/consol-reg/flrzoo4163/sch i.html; Tom Altobelli, Reflections on Primary Dispute
Resolution, BOND L. REV., Dec. I, 2001, at 1- 2, available at http://epublications.bond.edu.au/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 121 2&context=blr (showing that in Australia's family courts nego-
tiation, conciliation, arbitration and counseling are considered the "primary" dispute resolu-
tion processes with litigation being secondary).
84 See generally THE LAGOS MULTI- DOOR COURTHOUSE, http://www.lagosmultidoor.org/
(last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
85 For a discussion on the differences in dispute resolution approaches between the
United States and Latin America, see generally Mariana Hernindez Crespo, A Systemic Per-
spective ofADR in Latin America: Enhancing the Shadow ofthe Law through Citizen Participation, l o
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 91 (2oo8).
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has become quasi- institutionalized," though woefully underfunded."' The
multi- door courthouse concept has not been without its critics. Some have
described the movement as a byproduct of society's attempt to suppress
or conceal uncomfortable conflicts.8 Others assert that the movement has
contributed greatly to a de facto closing of the courthouse or at the very
least has erected barriers to entry by replacing thoughtful adjudication with
mere dispute processing.89 Notwithstanding these criticisms, there is little
question that the public is demanding approaches to dispute resolution
that are not purely binary in nature. There is no other explanation for the
rapid emergence of the private dispute resolution industry in the United
States and internationally.90
Over the years the idea of the multi- door courthouse has generally
been reduced to a choice between various forms of mediation or litigation.
Intake centers, tracking mechanisms, case evaluation and other components
necessary to fully realize the concept have not been developed at a level
that diversifies our approaches to dispute resolution. As a result, others
have stepped in creating, in the words of one observer, a situation where:
86 See CTR. FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & INST. FOR JUDICIAL ADMIN., NATIONAL STANDARDS
FOR COURT- CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS i (1998), available at http://courtadr.org/files/
NationalStandardsADR.pdf; ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL
MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 1- 2 (200 1); MELINDA OSTERMEYER & SUSAN L. KEILITZ, NAT'L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MONITORING AND EVALUATING COURT- BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROGRAMS: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 2 (1997); ELIZABETH PLAPINGER &
DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. & CPR INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ADR AND SET-
TLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES & LAWYERS 3 (1996);
Transcript, A Dialogue between Professors Frank Sander andMariana Hernandez Crespo: Exploring
the Evolution of the Multi- Door Courthouse, 5 U. ST. T"IoMAS L.J. 665,670 (2008); Douglas A. Van
Epps, The Impact of Mediation on State Courts, 17 OHIo ST. J. DisP. RESOL. 627,629- 30 (2002).
87 See David A. Hoffman, Certifying ADR Providers, BOSTON B.J., Apr. 1996, at 22 (noting
that budget shortfalls have been a major impediment to expanding programs); Gladys Kessler
& Linda J. Finkelstein, The Evolution of a Multi- Door Courthouse, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 577,
585 (1988) (discussing the need for permanent funding since initial sources and fee- based
approaches are unreliable).
88 See Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in
the Movement to Re- Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. i, 5 (1993).
89 See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adju-
dication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 211, 245 (1995).
90 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRI-
VATE- SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7 (1995) (finding that most
employers with over 1oo employees use ADR in one or more avenues including: eighty per-
cent for fact finding; ninety percent for mediation; and ten percent for mandatory arbitration);
Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public- Law Disputes, 1995
U. ILL. L. REv. 635, 635- 36 (1995); Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Con-
sent in Pre- Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 12o6- 07 (2002); Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation:
It's Here to Stay andMuch Better than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196 (2003); Symposium on Sports Law
and Alternative Dispute Resolution, CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. (2001), http://www.cojcr.org/
vOl3no I/symposia.html.
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The courts face a burgeoning industry in alternative dispute resolution,
including private judging, that threatens to siphon off many civil cases,
including those of litigants wealthy enough to afford it and who find
the possibility of avoiding public regulation or scrutiny attractive. In the
public policy world... adjudication in public courts for the resolution of
disputes is passd; the focus is on its alternatives.9
Consequently, we must concede that although disputes must be
resolved justly, not every dispute requires the same level of resources. Not
every person that walks into a hospital is automatically assumed to need a
doctor. Medical cases are evaluated; procedures appropriate to the nature
of the case are triggered; resources corresponding to the severity of the
injury are allocated. In the end the operating theater becomes that forum
where the most seriously injured are treated with 'the best tools available
by specifically trained individuals in the most expeditious manner. The
fact that a patient may want to see a doctor does not mean that it must
be offered to them in the first instance when other treatment options and
personnel may be equally effective.
There are, admittedly, vast differences between the justice system
and medical system. But, there is something to be said for examining how
other systems deliver services not simply more efficiently but also more
effectively. Both the justice system and the medical system are structured
to deal with problems ranging from the simple to the complex, the
mundane to the critical. Yet one system has adopted hugely flexible and
innovative approaches to resolving problems and ensuring that cases are
sent to the most appropriate process for resolution. Access to the courtroom
- in effect the courthouse operating theater - should be the last resort after
other avenues have been exhausted. The right to due process is the right
to a just and effective process that is due, driven by the considerations
of each case. State courts cannot continue to operate on an eighteenth or
nineteenth century model when the twenty- first century is increasingly
demanding sophisticated specialization, dynamic processes, and refined
resource allocation. Everyone has a right to his or her day in court. The
question for the twenty- first century is does this mean a place or an
appropriate process?
IV. INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Two hallmarks of American judicial culture are the pervasiveness with
which the concepts of (1) judicial independence and (2) tradition weave
their way through everything including organizational leadership. From
the decisional process to institutional governance, independence bolstered
a strong tradition of individual autonomy and seniority producing an
organization and cultural paradigm of court governance that is "loosely
91 Lauren K. Robel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. L.J. 89 I, 892 (1993).
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coupled," 92 a term state court leaders see as highly descriptive.93 The
autonomous attitude within many courts is supported, in large measure,
by judicial selection processes that place a premium on loyalty to the local
electorate more than loyalty to institutional cohesion. 4 Accordingly, two
competing and complementary behaviors are taking place in most state
court organizations: (1) the prerogative of individual judges versus the
collective interests of the courts;9" and (2) local court autonomy versus the
overarching organization and management of a complex public system.
As Mary McQueen, President of the National Center for State Courts
has observed, court governance may be the "next frontier" to tackle in
improving our state judicial systems. 6  For courts, like universities and
hospitals, present complex leadership and organizational dynamics far
different from those seen in the private sector or even other government
92 See LARRY HIRSCHHORN, CTR. FOR APPLIED RESEARCH, LEADING AND PLANNING IN
Loos ELY COUPLED SYSTEMS, I (1994), available at http://www.cfar.com/Documents/Lead-LCS.
pdf (authority in loosely- connected organizations is as dependent upon collegial relations as
formal sources of power). Similar organizations include medical centers, courts, and higher
education. See, e.g., ThoMAS N. GILMORE ET AL., CTR. FOR APPLIED RESEARCH, CHALLENGES OF
LEADING AND PLANNING IN HIGHER EDUCATION I- 2 (1999), available at http://www.cfar.com/
Documents/LeadEd.pdf.
93 See Mary C. McQueen, Governance - the Final Frontier, in PERSPECTIVES ON STATE
COURT LEADERSHIP (forthcoming 2012).
94 The United States has a long tradition of judicial elections. In explaining this phe-
nomenon, Lawrence Friedman noted:
The elective principle, thus, was one way to solve the problem of judicial power.
Judges were supposed to be impartial and neutral, mere servants of the law ...
In a common law system, the judges invent or modify many of the working legal
rules. Judges clearly exercised power. They were part of the system of checks and
balances; but who was going to check and balance them? One obvious answer was:
the voters.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 81 -82 (3d ed. 2005); see also Bradley A.
Smith, Selecting Judges in the 21st Century, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 437, 440 (2002).
95 Fragmentation in the leadership and administration of a judicial system can permit
judges within individual courthouses to thwart implementation of changes that they do not
support. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL 198
(1983).
96 See McQueen, supra note 93. McQueen notes the following with regard to court gov-
ernance:
Whether judges have heard the term "loosely coupled" or not, they can appre-
ciate and recognize its dynamics in their daily work. Loosely coupled organiza-
tions are defined as systems I) with a federated governance structure consisting
of individuals and groups possessing a high degree of autonomy for daily work;
a) where dual demands between accountability and autonomy create tensions;
3) with unpredictable, misunderstood or changeable relationships (linkages) be-
tween and among individuals and leadership; 4) that require increasingly complex
and knowledge extensive decision- making; and 5) demonstrating weak support
for organizational integration and high support for professional specialization. State
courts align with all five.
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operations.97 Leadership of the courts is an area ripe for considerable
rethinking in the twenty- first century, primarily for two reasons.9"
First, most state constitutions vest leadership authority over the
courts directly in the state judiciary generally using one of two models:
(1) supreme courts; 9 or (2) judicial councils.)D Consequently, courts as
institutions cannot avoid addressing the emerging leadership challenges.101
The tradition- bound and autonomy- bound culture that has historically
defined courts is confronting new developments that increasingly challenge
notions of individual autonomy, at least at levels previously enjoyed.
Sophisticated technologies are driving interconnectedness of individuals
supported by evolving notions of "social networks" in an increasingly
"borderless" world.' Organizational realignments are driving the demand
to "flatten" managerial hierarchies, promote interdependency of effort and
governance, and give greater attention to leadership ability.
Second, we have to acknowledge that today's state courts are no longer
a collection of small autonomous operations that exist largely off the
radar of policymakers and the public. State courts have evolved into large
complex public institutions defined by growing sets of interdependencies.
Over the last fifty years there has been a tremendous amount of budgetary
consolidation at the state level0 3 and during this same period the
97 Cf. THE PSYCHODYNAM ICS OF ORGANIZATIONS: LABOR AND SOCIAL CHANGE 67- 84 (Larry
Hirschhorn & Carole K. Barnett eds., 1993) (offering a case study of professionals, authority,
and group life in law firms).
98 The organization and governance of state courts have been variously described by
a range of models from constellation (a loose association of courts which form a system only
in the most general of terms) to confederation (a relatively consolidated court structure and
a central authority which exercises limited power) to federation (a court structure that is rela-
tively complex where units are bound together at the state level by a strong, central authority)
to union (a fully consolidated and centralized system of courts with a single, coherent source
of authority). See THOMAS A. HENDERSON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
JUDICIAL STRUCTURE: THE EFFECT OF UNIFICATION ON TRIAL COURT OPERATIONS 35- 51 (1984).
99 E.g., Ky. CONST. § I1O(5)(b); Mo. CONST. art. V, § 4; MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2; WIs.
CONST. art. VII, § 4(3).
100 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6; UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 12.
ioi For an excellent discussion on judicial leadership principles, see generally DURHAM
& BECKER, supra note 17.
102 See, e.g., Jeanne Charn, Service And Learning: Reflections on Three Decades of the Law-
yering Process at Harvard Law School, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 75, 92 n.53 (2003) (citing Larry
Hirschhorn & Katherine Farquhar, Productivity, Technology and the Decline of the Autonomous
Professional, 2 OFF.: TECH. & PEOPLE 265 (1985)) (discussing legal aids and "processes that
are integrating professionals more closely into the work and priorities of organizations" and
concluding that "professionals may lose some autonomy" but gain "effectiveness and respon-
siveness").
103 There are various funding models for state courts. California is an example of a
purely state funded system. The more prevalent model is a distributive model in which costs
are divided between the state and local governments. North Carolina and South Dakota, for
example, operate a centralized budget model in which the state bears operational and person-
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programmatic reach of state courts has expanded exponentially °4 Today's
courts frequently operate with state budgets of hundreds of millions of
dollars or more.10 s Our lexicon is filled with programmatic terms such
as problem- solving courts, 106 restorative justice, 107 social impact, and
performance measuring. Our administrative structures are complex
nel costs with facilities remaining the responsibility of local governments. In other states, like
Missouri, the state covers most personnel costs with operational costs covered by local gov-
ernment. In states such as Ohio, the state provides salary supplements to judges and staff but
the bulk of the system is locally funded. Budget Resource Center, supra note 4. As a result of the
move to greater state funding, judicial budgets have grown over time although they remain
minute components of overall state spending. One reason it is so difficult to reduce state court
spending is because (i) state courts often operate on the margins of state spending, (2) the
judiciary is required to maintain operations in every county, and (3) the bulk of state court
expenditures relate to personnel costs leaving little room to absorb cuts out of operations.
104 See Laura K. Abel, Evidence- Based Access to Justice, 13 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 295,
295- 96 (2010) (examining how state courts and civil legal aid programs are using a variety of
means to expand access); Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structuresfor the Delivery ofADR Services
by Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 715, 720 (i999) ("[T]he
reach and diversity of state court ADR programs makes the job of comparing the different
models ... difficult."); Daniel M. Filler & Austin E. Smith, The New Rehabilitation, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 951, 954 (2oo6) (discussing specialty courts in addressing juvenile delinquency); Judith
S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, Judicial Responses to Domestic Violence: The Casefora Problem Solving
Approach, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (discussing emerging domestic violence thinking).
Part of the expanding programmatic reach of state courts is the leveraging of social service
programs to promote case outcomes. See Connie J. A. Beck et al., Collaboration between Judges
and Social Science Researchers in Family Law, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 451, 451, 464 (2009) (discussing
the similarities and differences between the law and social sciences and concluding that it is
essential that social scientists and judges continue to work together to solve their differences
and increase mutually beneficial knowledge).
105 For example, the California judicial budget is approximately $3.6 billion, the New
York judicial budget is approximately $2.53 billion, the New Jersey judicial budget is approxi-
mately $841 million, and the Texas judicial budget is approximately $646.5 million. Budget
Resource Center, supra note 4.
In terms of overall state spending these sums are marginally significant. California
spends almost forty- two billion dollars on Medicaid alone. California: Medicaid Spending, KAI-
SER FAM. FOUND., http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?cat=4&sub=47&rgn=6 (last
visited Apr. 5, 2012). However, court spending is not insignificant in terms of real dollars.
io6 Examples of problem- solving courts include: mental health courts; drug courts; do-
mestic violence courts; juvenile justice courts; sex offense courts; community courts; truancy
courts; veterans courts; and homeless courts. It is important to clarify a point about problem-
solving courts. Although the term "problem- solving courts" has become something of a catch
phrase, e.g., "drug courts," they are in most cases specialized dockets within an existing court
structure that use specialized approaches to meet litigants' special needs.
107 Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United States,
2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 413 (2003); Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice: An Empirically
GroundedMovement Facing Many Opportunities and Pitfalls, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 51'i,
526 (2007) (discussing how Minnesota's Washington County Court Services has made sys-
temic policy changes based on restorative justice principles); Carina Patritti, Note, Restoring
Human Trafficking Victims through Victim- Offender Dialogue, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
217, 235 (2010) (noting New York courts have embraced restorative justice).
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systems designed to handle everything from budgets, to personnel, to
sophisticated technology systems, 108 to courthouse design and construction,
to social service providers. Therefore, state courts are no longer simply a
loosely connected series of autonomous adjudicatory entities. They are
big businesses with complex requirements subject to greater institutional
scrutiny than perhaps at any time in their history.
To be clear, this is not a call for a particular judicial governance model
that is centric in structure. Different methods of judicial selection,
budgeting, staffing, jurisdiction, and culture caution against promoting
a single model for state court governance. But the changes that have
occurred over the last fifty years do mean that individual actions cannot be
segregated from institutional consequence, and institutional performance
is subject to greater public scrutiny and measurement. 109 Historic methods
of judicial leadership selection premised upon seniority''0 or rotation"'
do not ensure that the best potential leaders become the actual leaders.
Hierarchy- based leadership systems that are non-collaborative may not be
attentive to broad institutional interests and thus stifle local programmatic
innovation and creativity. Complex bureaucratic systems with multiple
layers of management may consume resources better directed to the
delivery of justice. Local parochialism that spurns institutional cohesion
and accountability can undercut the standing of the state courts as
an institution of government, making the judiciary look more like an
assortment of independent actors rather than a group of people dedicated
io8 It is important to note that the judicial systems of other nations are using technology
to ease access to justice. In Singapore the courts have a digital transcription system, E- Sig-
nages, electronic hearings, electronic queue management system, information kiosks, internet
videophone services, internet wireless hotspots, "Justiceonline" system, and mobile technol-
ogy facility services. Technology, SUPREME CT. SING., http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.
aspx?pglD=361 (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). Turkey's National Judicial Informatics System not
only ties together courts, public prosecutors and law enforcement, it was designed in coop-
eration with the nation's cell phone industry to provide near real time SMS updates on case
information. General Information, UYAP- NAT'L JUD. INFORMATICS Sys., http://www.e- justice.
gov.tr/presentation/generalinformation.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
io9 Several state courts individually or systemically have adopted performance mea-
sures to promote public trust and confidence in the effective administration of justice. See,
e.g., Utah Courts Performance Measures, UTAH ST. CTS., http://www.utcourts.gov/courtools/ (last
visited Apr. 5, 2012).
i io See, e.g., KA. CoNsT. art. 3, § 2 ("[Tlhe justice who is senior in continuous term of
service shall be chief justice. ); 28 U.S.C. § 45 (2oo6) ("The chief judge of the circuit shall
be the circuit judge in regular active service who is senior in commission .... ); 42 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 302(a) (West 2001) ("The Chief Justice of Pennsylvania shall be Chair and the
Justice of the Supreme Court with most seniority on the Council shall be Vice- Chair."); NEv.
Sup. CT. R. 7 ("The Chief Justice is the Justice whose current commission is senior in the date
of its issuance .... ").
iii See, e.g., ALA R. JUo. ADMIN. 6 ("In counties with more than one district judge, the
presiding circuit judge, with the advice and consent of a majority of circuit judges in the cir-
cuit, shall appoint a presiding district judge to serve a term of one (i) year.").
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to a common mission. Therefore, future state judicial governance must
be defined by greater attention to two critical principles: (1) collegiality,
cohesion, coherency, and interdependence within the institution,11 2 and (2)
acceptance of greater institutional scrutiny from outside the institution.'
13
This will require attention to improving institutional leadership and
institutional performance," l4 developing performance measures beyond case
processing,'15 and utilizing evidence- based approaches to justify existing
and new programs. 1 16 Improving governance and administrative systems
is not something the legislature can or should fix. It is fundamentally the
responsibility of the bench and the bar.
CONCLUSION
Since many state courts draw their organic powers directly from the
state constitution, they can exercise their powers with greater institutional
autonomy than their federal counterparts, as accountable to the democratic
112 See R. Dale Lefever, Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, The Integration of Judicial Independence
and Judicial Administration: The Role of Collegiality in Court Governance in FUTURE TRENDS IN
STATE COURTS 66, 69- 72 (201 0), available at http://vis-res.com/pdf/Trends2o o.pdf (discuss-
ing the role of collegiality in the trial court "self- governance" model based on relationships);
see also DURHAM & BECKER, supra note 17, at 5- 6 (recommending meaningful input from all
court levels into the decision making process, the establishment of clear, well- understood
and well- respected roles and responsibilities among governing entity, presiding judge, court
administrators, boards of judges and court committees, the establishment of a system that
speaks with a single voice, and the establishment of positive institutional relationships that
foster trust among other branches and constituencies).
113 See CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'R, WHITE PAPER ON PROMOTING A CULTURE
OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY: COURT SYSTEM PERFORMANCE MEASURES 3, 4, 12- 14
(Dec. 2oo8), available at http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/AGP.Net/Components/documentViewer/
Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=48735 (discussing the need for the development of court
performance measures to ensure courts are accountable and transparent in the face of in-
creased external scrutiny).
114 See Daniel J. Hall, Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Principles of Judicial Administration: The
Lens of Change, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 151, 152- 55 (2OI I), available at http://
www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future- trends/home/Enhancing- Access/-/media/
Microsites/Files/Future%zoTrends/Author%2oPDFs/Hall.ashx (setting out twenty- four
principles which the author indicates are unifying concepts that offer means of addressing the
tension between the self interest of those working within the courts and the organizational
culture of the courts).
115 See Court Tools, NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsconline.org/D..Research/
CourTools/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2o 12) (discussing additional trial and appellate
court performance measures).
116 See, e.g., Jessica Feinstein, Reforming Adult Felony Probation to Ease Prison Overcrowd-
ing: An Overview of California SB. 678, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 375,392- 93 (zo II) (discussing new re-
quirements that probation departments develop and implement evidence- based practices);
Max Deitchler, Comment, You Can't Manage What You Don't Measure: An Evaluation of Arkan-
sas's Drug Courts, 64 ARK. L. REV. 715, 735 (zo 1) (discussing the need for evidence- based
practices).
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processes (for good and ill) as they are to the coordinate branches of
government. This autonomy affords state judiciaries the opportunity and
responsibility to branch out, to be innovative in addressing the public's
evolving legal needs. Such adaptability and freedom has historically led
to great innovations, including the nation's truly first specialized docket -
the juvenile court system.' If states are the laboratories of democracy,"8
then state courts are the laboratories of American judicial power. But
this innovative freedom comes with a catch. It is fundamentally the
responsibility of the courts and the legal profession -of law schools, judges,
administrators, and the bar - to leverage this unique position and capacity
to provide the vision necessary to promote a culture of constant innovation
at the very core of the system.
In the end, the fiscal crisis confronting state courts is not simply a crisis
of money nor is it a crisis that money alone can solve. To confront it as
such is to ignore the larger forces at play . Our state judiciaries are in a
state of crisis for a range of reasons defined by the bookends of professional
inattention and declining public support, as well as the potential for
growing functional irrelevancy and institutional ineffectiveness. Believing
that state justice systems can weather the current storm without deeply
considering the things that brought us to this point and embracing the
need for innovative change is to ignore both threat and opportunity. We
cannot rely on eighteenth and nineteenth century models in the twenty-
first century where change is happening at the speed of light and our
very understanding of organizations and institutions is evolving rapidly.
Relying on a vision of the courts that really no longer exists and that fails to
account for the need for still greater coherence, innovation, effectiveness,
and accountability undercuts our ability to meet the public's demand and
garner their support. The result is reduced relevancy and unequal access
to justice.
117 In 1899 Illinois passed the Juvenile Court Act effectively creating the nation's first
juvenile court. Matthew Thomas Wagman, Innocence Lost in the Wake of Green: The Trend is
Clear-If You Are Old Enough to Do the Crime, Then You Are Old Enough to Do the Time, 49 CATT.
U. L. REv. 643, 643 (20o0) (citing Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union
of North Carolina Legal Foundation in Support of Appellant at 3, State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d
819 (N.C. 1998) (No. 519A96) (providing a brief history of the juvenile justice system and
explaining its purposes)).
118 Justice Louis Brandeis popularized the concept of "laboratories of democracy" in
his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932), noting that
"[iut is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may..
. serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country."
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